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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Heath Clyne appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied his motion for leave to amend his petition for post conviction relief, and 
wl1en it summarily dismissed his petition for relief. 
In regard to the decision to summarily dismiss the petition, Mr. Clyne contends 
that the evidence before the district court presented two genuine issues of material fact. 
The first issue was that Mr. Clyne received ineffective assistance of counsel when his 
defense counsel argued against Mr. Clyne's interests by arguing he was not a good 
candidate for probation, even though plea agreement provided for a 
recommendation of probation from the State. The second issue was that Mr. Clyne 
received ineffective assistance of counsel when his defense counsel failed to seek or 
secure a mental health evaluation that met the requirements of I.C. §§ 19-2522, -2523, 
and/or -2524. 
Mr. Clyne had moved for leave to amend his petition to clarify and add factual 
support for those allegations. In denying that motion, the district court abused its 
discretion in two regards. First, it erroneously concluded that the claim regarding the 
mental health evaluation had been raised in Mr. Clyne's direct appeal from the denial of 
his motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35 motion). Second, it 
erroneously concluded that no amendment was necessary on the claim regarding trial 
counsel arguing against Mr. Clyne's interests because that issue had been presented in 
Mr. Clyne's pro se petition. It made that decision despite the fact that it intended to 
1 
summarily dismiss the petition based on the belief that it only presented bare and 
conclusory allegations. 
As a result of these errors, this Court should reverse the order denying 
Mr. Clyne's motion for leave to amend his petition, vacate the judgment of dismissal, 
and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Clyne pied guilty, pursuant to a plea 
agreement, to one count of burglary. (Augmentation - Judgment of Conviction.)1 The 
plea agreement called for the State to recommend that the district court suspend 
Mr. Clyne's sentence for a period of probation. (R., pp.64-66; see R., p.79.) The district 
court ordered a mental health evaluation be performed on Mr. Clyne as part of the 
presentence report (hereinafter, PSI). (Augmentation - Order for PSI.) However, at the 
sentencing hearing, district court discussed the adequacy of the report generated in that 
regard: "having ordered a mental health evaluation, the Court's in a position where 
essentially I don't have one. This evaluation is so terrible that it is the equivalent of 
nothing." (R., p.83.) However, based on the representations of Mr. Clyne's attorney, it 
did not order a new evaluation and proceeded with the sentencing hearing. (R., p.85.) 
During that hearing, defense counsel uttered the recommendation from the plea 
bargain, recommending that the district court commute Mr. Clyne's sentence or, 
alternatively, suspend it for a two-year period of probation. (R., p.85.) However, 
1 A motion requesting that this Court augment the record with, and take judicial notice 
of, several documents of which the district court took judicial notice below has been filed 
contemporaneously with this brief. Citations to any of those documents will identify the 
documents as "Augmentation." 
2 
defense counsel effectively disavowed that recommendation by making several 
assertions to the effect that Mr. Clyne was not a suitable candidate for probation. 
(R., pp.84-85.) The district court ultimately imposed a unified sentence of five years, 
with one year fixed, and it retained jurisdiction. (Augmentation - Judgment of 
Conviction.) The district court subsequently relinquished jurisdiction and executed 
Mr. Clyne's sentence. (Augmentation - Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction.) Thereafter, 
Mr. Clyne filed a Rule 35 motion asking for a reduction of his sentence. (Augmentation 
- Rule 35 Motion.) The district court denied that motion, noting that Mr. Clyne had not 
presented any additional documentation in support of his motion. (Augmentation -
Order Denying Rule 35 Motion.) Mr. Clyne filed a notice of appeal which was timely 
only from the order denying his Rule 35 motion. (See Augmentation - Appellant's Brief, 
pp.3-4.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the order denying the Rule 35 motion because 
Mr. Clyne did not present new or additional information in support of his motion. 
State v. Clyne, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 410 (Ct. App. Mar.11, 2014). 
While that direct appeal was pending, Mr. Clyne filed a pro se petition for post 
conviction relief, and the post conviction petition was timely from the judgment of 
conviction. (R., pp.4-1 O; Augmentation - Judgment of Conviction.) He alleged that his 
trial attorney was ineffective for several reasons, including having a conflict of interest, 
failing to present evidence in mitigation at the sentencing hearing, and providing 
insufficient argument at the sentencing hearing. (R., pp.5-6, 9-10.) He also moved for 
the appointment of counsel. (R., pp.25-27.) The State denied those allegations, and 
moved for an order summarily dismissing the petition. (R., pp.34-40.) 
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The district court decided to appoint counsel to represent Mr. Clyne. (R., p.42.) 
The district court subsequently "gave Petitioner's counsel additional time to meet and 
confer with Petitioner and, if warranted, file an amended petition." (R., p.52.) 
Thereafter, the district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss the petition, which 
adopted the reasons articulated in the State's motion for summary dismissal as the 
basis for the district court's decision. (R., p.61.) 
On the same day the district court filed its notice of intent dismiss the petition, 
Mr. Clyne, through post conviction counsel, filed a motion for leave to amend the 
petition for post conviction relief. (R., pp.63-66.) That motion included the proposed 
amended petition, which would have revised the allegations to assert three claims for 
relief: (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate 
the case and obtain mitigating evidence, specifically, a mental health evaluation which 
conformed with I.C. §§ 19-2522, -2523, and/or -2524; (2) the district court deprived 
Mr. Clyne of due process by failing to order said statutorily-adequate mental health 
evaluation; and (3) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by arguing 
against Mr. Clyne's interests at the sentencing hearing, specifically, by arguing against 
Mr. Clyne's suitability for release on probation even though the plea agreement 
provided that the State would recommend probation. (R., pp.64-66; see R., p.79.) The 
proposed amendment also alleged that, as a result of not having a statutorily-adequate 
mental health evaluation, the district court "failed to consider" whether Mr. Clyne could 
have been treated in the community for his mental health issues when it decided to 
retain jurisdiction over Mr. Clyne instead of suspending his sentence. (R., p.65.) 
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However, despite its previous permission for conviction counsel to file an 
petition, the district court the motion it determined that 
the claims were not properly raised in the post conviction and that the third claim 
already been presented in Mr. Clyne's prose motion. (R., pp.90-91.) In regard to 
the claim about trial counsel's failure to obtain a mental health evaluation, the district 
court determined that the same issue had been raised in Mr. Clyne's direct appeal.2 
(Tr., p.22, Ls.2-11.) As to the claim that the district court deprived Mr. Clyne of due 
process, the district court determined that it should have been raised on direct appeal.3 
(Tr., 1, L.21- L.1.) Finally, on the claim that trial counsel argued against 
Mr. Clyne's interests at the sentencing hearing, the district court pointed out that the 
claim had been presented to the district court in Mr. Clyne's pro se petition; therefore, 
while the district court noted that it would consider the merits of that claim, it denied the 
motion to amend. (Tr., p.21, Ls.6-20.) 
Post conviction counsel subsequently filed an objection to summary dismissal 
and a cross motion for summary disposition. (R., pp.97-105.) Post conviction counsel 
discussed more facts which supported Mr. Clyne's claims for relief, and also argued that 
the district court's decision to deny the motion to amend the petition was erroneous. 
(R., pp.98-104.) However, the district court concluded that post conviction counsel's 
objection did not address the concerns in the notice of intent to dismiss (i.e., that the pro 
se motion alleged insufficient facts to make out a claim for relief (R., pp.38-40, 61 )), 
2 Mr. Clyne's direct appeal only challenged the decision to deny his Rule 35 motion. 
~Augmentation -Appellant's Brief.) 
Mr. Clyne does not challenge the district court's conclusion on the second contention, 
conceding that, insofar as that claim could have been raised on direct appeal, it should 
have been. 
5 
to ruling on the motion amend , denied cross 
summary judgment, and summarily dismissed Mr. petition for relief. 
(R., pp.107-110.) Mr. Clyne filed a notice of appeal timely from that judgment. 





its discretion when it denied r. motion 
2. Whether the district court erroneously summarily dismissed Mr. Clyne's petition 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Clyne's Motion To Amend 
His Petition 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Clyne contends that the district court did not reach its decision to deny his 
motion to amend regarding his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel through an 
exercise of reason. The motion for leave to amend sought to add factual allegations 
and clarify the claims being raised in the petition for relief. However, the district court 
the amendment was not necessary because it erroneously determined that one 
of the amended claims had been raised on direct appeal, and it determined that the 
amendment to a second claim was because it had been presented in the 
prose petition (even though the district court had indicated it intended to dismiss the pro 
se petition because it presented only bare, conclusory claims for relief). Those 
decisions constitute an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
Post conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and therefore, are governed by 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.). McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 699-
700 (1999). In the relevant circumstance, those rules provide: "a party may amend a 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires." I.R.C.P. 15(a). As a result of this rule, 
motions to amend pleadings "are to be liberally granted." Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 
140 Idaho 522, 528 (2004) (emphasis added). "The purpose behind allowing a party to 
amend its complaint is so that all claims will be decided on their merits and provide 
notice of the claim and all facts at issue." Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality 
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Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 492 (2003). It is preferable for claims to be 
resolved "on the merits rather than on technicalities." Carl f{ Christensen Family 
Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871 (1999). 
Ultimately, the decision of whether to allow a party to amend its pleading is 
addressed to the discretion of the district court. Estate of Becker, 140 Idaho at 528. 
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether 
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and 
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Hedger, 1 i 5 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (internal quotation omitted). The district 
court's decision to deny the motion to amend the petition in this case fails on the second 
and third levels of the Hedger test. As such, that decision inconsistent with the rule to 
liberally allow amendments to pleadings. Therefore, that decision constituted an abuse 
of the district court's discretion. 
B. The District Court's Decision To Deny The Motion To Amend The Post 
Conviction Petition Was Inconsistent With Precedent And Was Not Reached 
Through An Exercise Of Reason 
When petitioners file pro se petitions for post conviction relief, those "petitions 
and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete." 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) (quoting Brown v. Sate, 135 Idaho 
676, 679 (2001 ), superseded by statute on other grounds). In recognition, we appoint 
counsel in and allow liberal amendment of the pleadings in those cases. In fact, the 
only justification for summarily dismissing Mr. Clyne's petition was that Mr. Clyne's 
petition was conclusory and incomplete: 
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Petitioner provides no specifics as to what vvas argued, how counsel's 
arguments were ineffective, or what could have been argued that would 
have been more effective . . . other than making bare assertions or 
allegations of ineffective assistance, he has provided nothing to allege or 
show deficiency of performance. Additionally he has failed to show 
prejudice .... In short, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden as he has 
not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome had different 
arguments been made and therefore his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel should be summarily dismissed without a hearing. 
(R., pp.38-40; see also R., pp.61, 107-08 (the district court adopting the State's 
argument as its justification for summary dismissal).) 
The fact that the district court denied the motion to amend the petition is deeply 
concerning because the amended petition sought to rectify those shortcomings in 
Mr. Clyne's pro se petition. The proposed amended petition alleged specific facts that 
clarified the claims for relief. (R., pp.64-66.) In that regard, post conviction counsel was 
simply doing his job: "If [the petitioner] alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid 
claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give the petitioner an 
opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts." 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (emphasis added). 
As a result, the district court's decision effectively prevented Mr. Clyne from 
responding to the stated justifications for summary dismissal. That, in and of itself, 
demonstrates the district court's abuse of discretion and justifies relief on appeal, since, 
as the Idaho Supreme Court has held: "A petitioner is entitled to notice of the trial 
court's contemplated grounds for dismissal and an opportunity to respond before a 
petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed. Failure to provide such notice and 
opportunity to be heard may result in the reversal of a summary dismissal of a petition 
for post conviction relief." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010). 
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Furthermore, the reasons the district court for the motion to 
petition were inconsistent with precedent and were not reasonable in light 
justification for summarily dismissing the petition. a result, the denial of the motion to 
amend the petition constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
-1. The District Court's Decision To Deny The Motion To Amend The Petition 
Regarding The Claim That Trial Counsel Failed To Obtain A Statutorily-
Adequate Mental Health Evaluation Was Inconsistent With Precedent And 
Did Not Constitute An Exercise Of Reason, And So, Was An Abuse Of 
Discretion 
In regard to the claim that trial counsel failed to seek or secure a statutorily-
adequate mental health evaluation, the district court denied the motion to amend 
petition because the same issue "is being raised directly in the appeal from the Court's 
decision denying the Rule motion." (Tr., Ls.5-7.) being factually 
wrong, that analysis ignored precedent that either expressly disallows for such claims to 
be, or highly recommends that claim not be, addressed in the direct appeal. Therefore, 
that decision was not within the district court's discretion. 
First, the district court's assertion that the same issue was raised in the direct 
appeal is factually wrong. In the Rule 35 appeal, Mr. Clyne simply argued that, based 
on the evidence already in the record, particularly the information about Mr. Clyne's 
mental health condition, the district court's decision to deny his Rule 35 motion 
constituted an abuse of discretion. (Augmentation - Appellant's Brief.) As such, on 
direct appeal, Mr. Clyne challenged the district court's decisions after the sentencing 
hearing, whereas, in the post conviction case, Mr. Clyne challenged his attorney's 
decisions prior to the sentencing hearing. Demonstrating this difference, in the direct 
appeal, Mr. Clyne had to acknowledge that no new or additional information had been 
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presented in support of his Rule 35 motion, as required by the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). Contrarily, in the post 
conviction petition, Mr. Clyne claimed that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
because he had not sought and presented mitigating evidence. (R., pp.64-66.) 
Therefore, while the post conviction argument may have been related to the argument 
pursued on direct appeal, it certainly was not the same issue. 
In fact, it would have been foolish, if not improper, for Mr. Clyne to have raised a 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his direct appeal from the Rule 35 
motion. Idaho's appellate courts have made it clear that claims for ineffective 
assistance of counsel are not appropriately raised on direct appeal. Matthews v. State, 
122 Idaho 80·1, 806 (1992) ("[A] petition for post-conviction relief is the preferred forum 
for bringing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel"); State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 
546, 549 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting that "the trial record on direct appeal is rarely adequate 
for review of [post conviction type] claims"). Idaho's appellate courts have also been 
clear about the limited scope of Rule 35 motions. See State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 
84-87 (2009) ( discussing the scope of Rule 35 motions); State v. Housley, 119 Idaho 
885, 889 (Ct. App. 1991) ("allegations, attacking the validity of [the] conviction, are 
beyond the scope of a Rule 35 motion. Other remedies, such as ... a petition for post 
conviction relief, are available" to make those claims). 
As a result, the district court's conclusion - that the claim of ineffective 
assistance included in the proposed amended petition had been raised in the direct 
appeal - is not based on substantial or competent evidence, and should be disregarded 




justification for denying Mr. Clyne's motion 
1 was inconsistent with the legal standards to 
decision and was not reached through an exercise of reason. As such, that decision 
should reversed. 
2. The District Court's Decision To Deny The Motion To Amend The Petition 
Regarding The Claim That Trial Counsel Argued Against Mr. Clyne's 
Interests Did Not Constitute An Exercise Of Reason, And So, Was An 
Abuse Of Discretion 
In regard to the claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance by arguing 
against Mr. Clyne's interests at the sentencing hearing, the district court denied the 
motion to amend the petition because it concluded that claim was already pending 
before the district court based on Mr. Clyne's pro se petition. (Tr., p.2·1, Ls.16-20.) 
However, that is not a reason to deny a motion to amend the petition, especially where 
the proposed amendment seeks to clarify the claim and provide additional factual 
allegations in support of that claim. In fact, that is one of the services appointed counsel 
is supposed to provide. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793. That is particularly true in 
this case since the only justification offered for summarily dismissal was that the 
allegations in the pro se petition were bare, conclusory allegations, which failed to 
establish a genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp.38-40, 61.) 
The proposed amendment alleged that counsel provided ineffective assistance 
by "fail[ing] to properly interview petitioner and correctly present facts and arguments to 
the court in mitigation of the crime." (R., p.66.) In support of that clarified claim for 
relief, it offered the following factual allegations: 
The Petitioner claims his attorney presented no evidence on his behalf 
and advised the court at sentencing that the Petitioner was not a good 
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candidate for probation, contrary to the plea bargain for probation that his 
attorney and the State of Idaho had negotiated. Without first obtaining a 
proper psychological evaluation, the Petitioner's counsel effectively 
argued against him at sentencing by failing to set forth any reasonable 
plan for probation, with mental health treatment in the community. 
(R., p.66.) The initial petition and affidavit did not provide any such specific factual 
allegations; Mr. Clyne had simply alleged that trial counsel "failed to argue and ad [sic] 
rebuttal and allow for more testimony." (See generally R., pp.4-9.) Because those 
additional allegations and clarifications were necessary to flesh out the claim so that it 
met the requirements to survive summary dismissal, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984), even though the claim itself may have been at issue before the 
district court, the amendment was necessary to continue pursuing that claim and 
establish a genuine issue of material fact. 
The paradox of the district court's decision is further evidenced by the fact that 
the district court expressly told defense counsel at least three times that he would be 
allowed to file an amended petition if he, trial counsel, determined that such action was 
necessary. (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-17 ("I wanted to give you an opportunity to review that case 
and potentially, if you deem that there are issue that warrant the filing of an 
amended petition, allow you to do that.") (emphasis added); Tr., p.11, Ls.4-5 ("If you 
deem warranted, file an amended petition.") (emphasis added); R., p.52 ("The Court 
gave Petitioner's counsel additional time to meet with Petitioner, and if warranted, file 
an amended petition.") (emphasis added).) Defense counsel obviously determined 
that an amended petition was necessary in this case, and so, filed a request to amend 
the petition per the indications the district court had previously given him. And yet, upon 
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requesting to amend the petition as he deemed appropriate, and, in effect, replying to 
the notice of intent to dismiss, the district court denied the motion. 
That decision was not reached through an exercise of reason. It certainly does 
not comport with the rule calling for liberally allowing parties to amend their pleadings, 
so that claims may be resolved on their merits, rather than on technicalities (like 
summary judgment for failing to articulate sufficient facts in support of the petition). See 
Estate of Becker, 140 Idaho at 528; Iron Eagle Development, 138 Idaho at 492; Carl 
H. Christensen Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 871. Therefore, the denial of Mr. Clyne's 
motion to amend his petition constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
11. 
The District Court Erroneously Summarily Dismissed Mr. Clyne's Petition For Post 
Conviction Relief In The Face Of At Least One Genuine Issue Of Material Fact 
A. Introduction 
Even if this Court determines that the district court properly denied the motion to 
amend the petition, the district court still improperly summarily dismissed the petition. 
Mr. Clyne presented a genuine issue of material fact that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a statutorily-adequate mental health 
examination and by arguing against his interests at the sentencing hearing. If either 
claim were resolved in his favor, he would be entitled to relief. Therefore, the district 
court's order summarily dismissing the petition should be reversed. 
In post-conviction cases, a petition may be summarily dismissed only if it does 
not present a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, 
would entitle him to relief. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008); see I.C. § 19-
15 
4906(b). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "[a] court is 
required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true .... "4 Baldwin, 145 
Idaho at 153; Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995). Additionally, during 
the summary judgment phase, the courts "liberally construe the facts and reasonable 
inferences in favor of the non-moving party."5 Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881 
(Ct. App. 2008); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) 
("[l]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the petitioner."). When a genuine issue 
of material fact exists and would, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, entitle the petitioner 
for relief, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 
153; Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,518 (1998). 
To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's 
performance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by 
that deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 
84 7, 850 (2004 ). In regard to the second prong of the Strickland test, a petitioner shows 
prejudice when he demonstrates that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 
would have been different, or, in other words, he must undermine confidence in the 
outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010). 
4 Where, as in this case, the State files an answer that denies the allegations in the 
verified petition (R., pp.30-33), those denials do not affirmatively disprove the 
allegations. Rather, they only create genuine issues of material fact in regard to those 
issues, specifically, whether or not the petitioner's allegations are factually accurate. 
Because a genuine issue of material fact exists in such cases, summary dismissal is 
inappropriate. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
5 In this case, the State is the moving party. (R., pp.34-40.) Therefore, the facts and 
reasonable inferences are liberally construed in Mr. Clyne's favor. Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 792; Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 881. 
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B Mr. Clyne Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Counsel 
Provided Ineffective Performance By Arguing Against Mr. Clyne's Interests At 
The Sentencing Hearing 
The district court acknowledged that Mr. Clyne's claim - that his attorney argued 
against his interests at the sentencing hearing raised a viable claim, "[a]nd that is the 
claim that I'm most concerned that it be heard and vetted, perhaps by way of an 
evidentiary hearing, if appropriate." (Tr., p.21, Ls.6-15.) An attorney's performance is 
objectively unreasonable if he actively argues against his client's interests. See, e.g., 
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278 n.10 (2000) (recognizing that "an indigent does, in 
all cases, have the right have an attorney, zealous for the indigent's interests, evaluate 
his case and attempt to discern nonfrivolous arguments"6) (emphasis added); 
Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (holding that defense counsel's "principal 
responsibility is to serve the undivided interests of his client"). 
The record supports Mr. Clyne's allegation that his counsel advocated against his 
interests.7 For example, the plea agreement Mr. Clyne entered provided as follows: 
6 Mr. Clyne sought a sentence that was suspended for a period of probation. An 
argument that suspending a sentence for a period of probation is not a frivolous 
argument. See, e.g., See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing 
objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives). That is 
especially true in this case, since, pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecutor made 
an argument that the district court should suspend Mr. Clyne's sentence. (R., p.83.) 
7 Post conviction counsel offered clarification and explanation of the facts in the record 
in the proposed amended petition. Counsel's explanations and clarifications of the facts 
in the record should have been considered by the district court, and they further 
demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact in this case. In addition, 
post conviction counsel represented that Mr. Clyne was prepared to sign the amended 
petition, indicating that he proposed to have the amended petition verified. (Tr., p.13, 
Ls.23-25.) In that case, the proposed amended petition would serve as evidence in its 
own right. However, that did not happen because the district court denied the motion to 
amend the petition. As such, if counsel's explanations and clarifications are not 
properly considered because they were excluded from the record by the district court 
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The to recommend a four-year period of probation with 
five-year sentence, consisting of one plus four suspended. The remaining 
charges will be dismissed. All other probation terms are basically open 
argument. agreed to pay restitution, but I don't actually think there's 
any restitution in this case. I think everything was recovered, but if the 
State has a figure of restitution related to either the charges he pleads 
guilty to, the dismissed charges, we agree to pay that. And the remaining 
charges will be dismissed. The defense can argue for less. 
(R., p.79; see also Augmentation Guilty Plea Advisory Form.) The record also 
demonstrates that, while trial counsel uttered a recommendation consistent with that 
plea agreement (R., p.85), trial counsel effectively disavowed that recommendation by 
arguing that Mr. Clyne was not a suitable candidate for probation: "But what we do see 
his PSI is that in ways he's going to trip up are likely he's going to drink or he is 
to have related mental health .... looking his history, it would 
demonstrate that he's going to have trouble probably on probation and parole, 
supervision .... He's probably not going to do probation right or parole right." 
(R., pp.84-85.) Therefore, the record demonstrates that counsel was not a zealous 
advocate on Mr. Clyne's behalf, and as such, the record demonstrates that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel's performance was objectively 
unreasonable. 8 
Mr. Clyne also alleged that, had counsel performed reasonably, he would have 
presented the district court with a reasonable plan for probation, with a provision for 
denying the motion to amend, that further demonstrates why the district court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion for leave to amend the petition. 
8 If this Court determines that the record affirmatively establishes that trial counsel did 
advocate against his client, and so, affirmatively establishes that trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Clyne's cross 
motion for summary judgment, and order summary judgment be entered in Mr. Clyne's 
favor on this claim. 
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receiving mental health treatment in the community. (R., p.66.) That, in combination 
with the fact that the State also recommend that the district court suspend sentence 
(R., p.83), establishes the reasonable probability that the result (the decision to retain 
jurisdiction) would have been different; certainly that evidence undermines confidence 
that the district court would still have opted to retain jurisdiction, as opposed to 
suspending the sentence. See McKay, 148 Idaho at 570. As such, Mr. Clyne's 
allegations also establish a genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced him. 
Furthermore, if that claim were resolved in Mr. Clyne's favor, he would be entitled 
to relief. See, e.g., !Nood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 273-74 (1981) (vacating a judgment 
because the defendant had sufficiently raised the specter of an actual conflict of interest 
in representation at the trial level which would have deprived the defendant of his 
constitutional rights, and remanding the case for further proceedings examining 
the potential conflict). Therefore, Mr. Clyne was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and 
thus, the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Clyne's petition for post 
conviction relief. 
C. Mr. Clyne Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Counsel 
Provided Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Seek Or Secure A Mental Health 
Evaluation That Conformed With The Statutory Requirements 
Mr. Clyne's other claim - that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not 
properly investigating the case and not presenting mitigating evidence at the sentencing 
hearing, specifically, by failing to seek or secure a psychological evaluation conforming 
with I.C. §§ 19-2522, -2523, and/or -2524 - also presented a genuine issue of material 
fact. The requirement that the district courts obtain a mental health evaluation when a 
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defendant's mental health will be a significant issue at sentencing is mandatory: "the 
court shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and 
report upon the mental condition of the defendant."9 I.C. § 19-2522(1) (emphasis 
added). 
In order to enforce this mandatory requirement, defense counsel needs to 
request an evaluation be performed or object when the district court seeks to proceed 
without one. State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 173-75 (2013). The necessary corollary to 
this rule is that, when defense counsel fails to ensure that a statutorily-adequate 
evaluation is included in the record, counsel's performance has been objectively 
unreasonable. 
It is undisputed that no current, statutorily-adequate evaluation was provided 
prior to sentencing. Furthermore, the district court asserted, "I need [a proper 
evaluation] to sentence this defendant." (R., p.83.) With that statement alone, the 
mandatory requirement from I.C. § 19-2522 for a proper evaluation should have been 
given effect. Compare State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822-23 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(holding that, when the district court indicates that defendant's mental health is going to 
be a significant issue at sentencing, it needs an evaluation conforming with I.C. § 19-
2522 before imposing sentence). The prosecutor also recognized that "the prudent 
course of action" would be to order a second evaluation, one that would conform with 
the statutory requirements. (R., p.83.) In fact, it was only Mr. Clyne's attorney who 
9 In this case, a second evaluation was necessary because the district court found that 
the evaluation originally provided was worthless: "having ordered a mental health 
evaluation, the Court's in a position where essentially I don't have one. This evaluation 
is so terrible that it is the equivalent of nothing." (R., p.83.) 
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eschewed the need to procure a conforming evaluation, pointing instead to other, older 
evaluations that had made diagnoses of Mr. Clyne in the past. (R., p.84.) 
However, trial counsel's attempted reliance on the older evaluations is not 
sufficient to meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. To make proper sentencing 
determinations, diagnoses and prognoses need to be current, since the symptoms can 
change, and as a result, the type of treatment necessary can change. For example, 
when a person suffers from multiple mental health disorders at the same time, 10 "the 
severity of both disorders may change overtime. Levels of disability and impairment in 
functioning may also vary." Psychology Today, "Diagnosis Dictionary: Co-Occuring 
Disorders," (2008) http://www.psychologytoday.com/conditions/co-occurring-disorders 
(last visited October 1, 2014 ). As such, the Court of Appeals has recognized that an old 
evaluation, "[e]ven a psychological report prepared pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 may be 
insufficient," to provide the necessary information the district court must consider under 
I.C. § 19-2523 at the new sentencing hearing. Durham, 146 Idaho at 370-71 (holding 
such even though the district court did have documents from a mental health facility into 
which the defendant had checked himself which provided a diagnosis of the defendant). 
In fact, the district court's comment at the sentencing hearing - that "I need it [the 
current mental health evaluation] to sentence this defendant (R., p.83) - which was 
made after the district court received all the other information about Mr. Clyne's prior 
evaluations contained in the PSI (see Tr., p.28, Ls.17-18 (the district court recalling that 
"I had an enormous amount of material regarding the defendant's mental health"), 
10 Mr. Clyne has been previously diagnosed with both bipolar disorder and 
schizophrenia. (See, e.g., R., p.84.) 
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demonstrates that the information the district court already had was insufficient to 
adequately meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. 
Furthermore, as the amended petition pointed out, Mr. Clyne's actions in the 
current case could potentially be attributed to particular diagnoses, and based on the 
consideration of the facts of the current case, the district court could have considered 
"whether the Petitioner could be treated for mental health concerns in the community 
instead of in prison." (R., p.65.) Because the facts of the current case could impact 
Mr. Clyne's diagnosis, both in terms of the nature of his mental condition and of 
potential treatment options, and that more accurate diagnosis could impact the 
sentencing decision, trial counsel's action - to affirmatively argue against the district 
court following a mandatory requirement in the statute - was objectively unreasonable. 
Compare State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 368-69 (Ct. App. 2008) (remanding a case 
for new sentencing with a statutorily-adequate evaluation, emphasizing the fact that the 
new offense was out of character for the defendant and "factually irrational" as some of 
the reasons the new evaluation was necessary). 
As in Durham, the offense in this case was factually irrational. Mr. Clyne was 
charged with taking a black Bible case, flashlights, and a pair of sunglasses from two 
cars in an Albertson's parking lot in broad daylight. (Augmentation - Appellant's Brief, 
p.2; Augmentation - Information.) As post conviction counsel pointed out, that behavior 
could have been attributable to Mr. Clyne's mental conditions. (R., p.65.) Thus, as in 
Durham, a new evaluation conforming to the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522 needed to 
be conducted prior to sentencing; the older evaluations were not sufficient in that 
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Durham, 1 Idaho at 367. such, the district court 
without the statutorily-required information. 
Mr. Clyne also alleged facts establishing a genuine issue of material fact that trial 
counsel's defective performance in this regard prejudiced him. Mr. Clyne alleged that, 
had trial counsel performed reasonably and sought a statutorily-adequate evaluation, he 
would have recommended a term of probation with an appropriate provision for 
receiving adequate treatment in the community. (R., pp.65-66.) When that is 
considered in combination with the fact that the State also recommended that the 
district court suspend Mr. Clyne's sentence (R., p.83), the facts establish the reasonable 
probability that the result (the decision to retain jurisdiction) would have been different. 
Essentially, Mr. Clyne alleged that, had the district court had an up-to-date mental 
health evaluation, which would have evaluated Mr. Clyne's current extent of his mental 
illness, his current prognosis for improvement and rehabilitation, and the level of care 
currently necessary to address his condition while protecting the public (as required by 
I.C. § 19-2523), the district court would not have retained jurisdiction, but instead, would 
have suspended his sentence. Therefore, Mr. Clyne's allegations established a 
genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. 
Furthermore, if the issue were resolved in Mr. Clyne's favor, he would be entitled 
to relief. Compare Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822-23; Durham, 146 Idaho at 367. As a 
result, Mr. Clyne was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and thus, the district court erred 
in summarily dismissing Mr. Clyne's petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
r. Clyne respectfully that this Court reverse the order denying his 
motion to amend his petition for post conviction relief, the judgment summarily 
dismissing his petition, and remand this case forfurther proceedings. 
DATED this 8th day of October, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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